Homer's Cultural Children

The Myth of Troy and European Identity

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This article seeks to demonstrate how the myth of Troy is still relevant to modern-day European culture and identity, drawing on Gregor Feindt et al.'s concept of "entangled memory" as a theoretical foundation. In order to support this claim, it discusses Wolfgang Petersen's movie *Troy* (2004), the successful exhibition *Troy—Dream and Reality* that opened in Germany in 2001; the heated debate sparked by this exhibition among German scholars; and the political discussion about Turkey's unsuccessful application for membership in the European Union, in which references to Troy played a surprising role.

Keywords: European identity; collective memory; memory studies; myth; Homer; Troy; entangled memory; intentional history

Introduction

What is Europe? A geographical location and a political entity, certainly, but just living in Spain or Greece, Great Britain, Germany or Switzerland does not make a person "European," whether the country is a member of the European Union or not. In a much more encompassing sense, *Europe* has to be conceptualized "as an idea, as a cultural construct … as a bundle of diverse traditions creating one cultural identity," and as the product of a common history, of shared rituals and narratives constituting a common cultural memory.[1] In this article, I will follow one particular thread of this memory discourse in order both to analyze the way it has shaped and molded European culture and identity and to examine the way

DOI: 10.2979/histmemo.29.2.03

it continues to exert its influence today. The "thread" in question is the myth of Troy, which found its canonical literary form in Homer's *Iliad*.[2]

Homer's epics, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, are considered not only "the beginning of classical Greek civilization," but also "the *fons et origio* of Western culture" in general, which in this context means European culture.[3] Much more than the *Odyssey*, the story of Odysseus's ten years of wandering in his quest to return home, the narrative of the *Iliad* has left its mark on European history from antiquity throughout the Middle Ages and up to the present, when, as Adam Goldwyn puts it, "the Trojan War as an artistic topic went global."[4] And while works of art do not constitute the focus of this argument, they are, of course, one medium in which the myth of Troy is propagated and therefore the necessary precondition for its continuing cultural influence.

In this article I will first argue that the seemingly natural opposition between Asia and Europe is in fact a historical construct, resulting from an age-old conflict between Greeks and non-Greeks that began—at least according to the Greek historian Herodotus—with the Trojan War. After providing the theoretical and terminological framework for my further argument by discussing Pierre Nora's category *lieu de mémoire* and comparing it to the much more versatile notion of "entangled memory" as proposed by Gregor Feindt et al., I will then use Hans-Joachim Gehrke's concept of "intentional history" to bridge the gap between collective memory and cultural identity and to briefly show how the myth of Troy has been used in the past to constitute collective cultural identities.

In the next step, I will set out to demonstrate that the myth of Troy is still relevant in modern European culture. Starting with a brief overview of its continued presence in contemporary popular culture as shown by Wolfgang Petersen's 2004 box-office hit *Troy*, I will consider the highly successful German exhibition *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit* as yet another example of the continuing fascination evoked by the myth of Troy. I will analyze how the scholarly debate over the meaning of the source material, the so-called "New Battle of Troy," can be perceived as a fight over the appropriate interpretation of a mnemonic signifier: depending on which interpretation is favored, the denomination "Troy" refers either to a "proto-urban" settlement of very limited significance and influence or to the central city of a powerful Trojan Civilization, located in Anatolia in modern-day Turkey.

It is the latter version, propagated by the German Troy exhibition and the accompanying scholarly material, that allows me to show that, at least on this one occasion, the myth of Troy gained considerable political importance: in an attempt to strengthen Turkey's claim to membership in the European Union, the Anatolian reinterpretation of the myth of Troy was used to underline the importance of Turkey for European culture and at the same time to redefine the cultural identity of the Turkish people as genuinely European. The way the myth of Troy was utilized in this case strikingly resembles similar strategies applied in Antiquity, once more stressing its lasting influence on European culture and identity.

Europe versus Asia: the creation of a cultural dichotomy

In 334 BCE King Alexander III of Macedon, later to be known as Alexander the Great, set out to wage war against Darius III, the king of the Persian Empire. From Pella, capital of the Macedon Kingdom, his army marched east towards the Hellespont, where he decided to visit one of the most famous places of the ancient world: the ruins of Troy. Alexander, who had been taught by Aristotle himself, knew the *Iliad* intimately, and valued it above all else. He "carried about with him Aristotle's recension of the text, which he called 'the *Iliad* of the casket' and always kept it under his pillow along with his dagger."[5] When, after Alexander defeated Darius in the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BCE, "he was brought a casket which was, in the estimation of those who had appropriated Darius' property and baggage, the most valuable item there, he asked his friends what they thought was important enough to be kept in it. Various suggestions were made, but he himself said that he would put the *Iliad* there for safe keeping."[6]

This anecdote, whether it is true or not, illustrates the unique importance of Homer and his epic for ancient Greek culture. According to Moses I. Finley, "No other poet, no other literary figure in all history, for that matter, occupied a place in the life of his people such as Homer's. He was their preeminent symbol of nationhood, the unimpeachable authority on their earliest history, and a decisive figure in the creation of their pantheon, as well as their most beloved and most widely quoted poet."[7] It is this eminent cultural significance that makes the myth of Troy relevant for

European cultural identity even today, and Plutarch's recollection of Alexander's behavior shows that it had a similar function in the ancient world:

> At Troy, he offered up a sacrifice to Athena and poured libations to the heroes. At Achilles' tombstone, he anointed himself with plenty of oil, ran a foot-race, naked as custom demands, with his friends, and crowned the tombstone with a garland, pronouncing Achilles fortunate for the true friend he found during his lifetime and the great herald he found after his death.[8]

It was not just literary appreciation, then, that made Alexander stop at Troy. In honoring Achilles, the Macedon king emphasized the similarities between himself and the fallen Greek *heros*, thus underlining his individual greatness and establishing himself as "Achilles reborn." At the same time he symbolically framed his own campaign against Persia not only as a second Trojan War but also as a mission of revenge for the Persian invasion in 480/79 BCE.[9]

To fully grasp the implications of this visit and the meaning and influence of the myth of Troy, it is necessary to understand how Greek conceptions of "self" and "other" developed in antiquity, specifically in the wake of the Persian Wars. Phiroze Vasunia explains that "Greeks defined themselves and their polities in opposition to barbarians and barbarian institutions." He notes that it is "during the aftermath of the Persian Wars, in the early fifth century B.C.E., when the notion of the barbarian begins to harden and take on pejorative connotations, and when Hellenes begin to articulate conceptual, political, and linguistic differences between themselves and barbaroi."[10]

Given the importance of the Persian Wars for the development of Greek identity, it is not surprising that the opposition between "Greeks" and "barbarians" should find a prominent manifestation in Aeschylus's *Persians*, a play originally produced in Athens at the Great Dionysus festival of 472 to celebrate the Greeks' victory over the Persian invaders under King Xerxes.[11] In fact, *Persians* can be considered "the earliest testimony to the absolute polarization in Greek thought of Hellene and barbarian," as indicated by the fact that in this play "the term *barbaros* itself, never found in extant mainland Greek literature before the Persian wars, is found no fewer than ten times, and the contrast of Hellas with Persia or Greeks with barbarians underlies the rhesis, dialogue, and lyr-

ics."[12] It has to be concluded, therefore, that "by the time of Aeschylus' Persians … the process of 'othering' and indeed inventing 'the barbarian' as a homogenized stereotype was well underway in Greece," and that the contrast typically ran along the lines of a "dichotomy between free and manly Greek/Athenian and servile and effeminate barbarian/Persian."[13]

This process of "othering" carries far-reaching implications, for in its course "the Classical Greeks divided all humankind into two mutually exclusive and antithetical categories: Us and Them or, as they put it, Greeks and barbarians."[14] Phrasing this antithesis in more general categories, Aeschylus's *Persians* can also be understood as the "most famous document demonstrating the conviction … of a polarity between Europe and Asia," in which "two diametrically opposed cultural identities are created."[15] In other words, the opposition of Europe versus Asia can be traced back to the emergence of a collective "Greek" identity in the aftermath of the Persian wars, when out of those very concepts emerged opposing sides of a cultural and ideological contrast.[16]

But what, one might ask, does all this have to do with Homer's *Iliad* and the myth of the Trojan War? The answer to this question can be found in Herodotus's *Histories*, published in 440 BCE, which is to say, more than thirty years after Aeschylus's *Persians* and about forty years after the Greek victory at Salamis and Plataea in 480/79 BCE. It is no surprise, then, that the Greco-Persian wars are the focal point of Herodotus's narrative. His depiction of the Persians, however, differs significantly from Aeschylus's play: not only are "individual Persians … given just as much narrative space as individual Greeks," the historian also goes to great length to avoid describing the Persians as a whole "as weak and despicable rulers of an evil empire, who got their just deserts at the hands of morally and physically superior Greeks."[17] It is this "hugely untypical"[18] attitude towards a non-Greek people that makes Herodotus "the most important and fair-minded source on Persia."[19] As Michael Flower observes, "if Herodotus' contemporaries shared a stereotype of the barbarian as weak, effeminate, and servile, he employs various narrative strategies to undercut it, challenge it, modify it, and subvert it."[20]

In some ways, this balanced approach is decidedly "Homeric," since "Homer bears little or no trace of ethnocentric and derogatory stereotyping of barbarians, indeed does not actually use the word *barbaros* in any but a descriptive sense.… Nor is any such process of 'othering' apparent

in the seventh or sixth centuries BCE."[21] This similarity is underscored by the observation that in the *Iliad* "the Trojans and the Achaeans are not viewed as being culturally distinct in any deeply significant way—both are governed by kings, worship the same gods, and practice the same customs."[22] But while Herodotus does not share "the pejorative, especially 'orientalist', connotations with which the term [barbarian] became charged in the Classical era,"[23] he still views "the Persians [as] culturally distinct from the Greeks, and that is why he includes a short ethnography on them in Book 1."[24]

It is also Herodotus, though, who explicitly links the contemporary political and cultural situation to the story of the Trojan War, thus providing the Greeks of his time with an explanation for the history of antagonism and hostility between themselves and the Persians. In the first chapter of his *Histories*, the historian briefly recounts the abduction of Helen of Sparta by Paris of Troy, along with the reaction of the Greeks, who "raised a mighty army because of a woman from Lacedaemon, and then invaded Asia and destroyed Priam and his forces." Herodotus concludes: "Ever since then, the Persians have regarded the Greeks as their enemies. They think of Asia and the non-Greek peoples living there as their own, but regard Europe and the Greeks living there as separate from themselves."[25]

In this passage, two aspects are of interest: First, Herodotus here tells the story from the Persian point of view, letting us know how *they* regard the Greeks. This change of perspective is relevant because it implies that the historian assumes a certain symmetry, an analogous development on both sides of the Hellespont: for the Persians the "other" in contrast to which they defined their own identity were the Greeks, making both peoples' respective concept of self the inverted image of the other. Second, Herodotus treats both the Persians and the Greeks as *partes pro toto*, as incarnations of the much more general, encompassing and abstract terms "Asia" and "Europe." Through this conceptional broadening, Herodotus connects the common notion of a contrast or opposition between Asia and Europe not only to the Persian wars but ultimately to the Trojan War itself, since, as he argues, the Persians "date the origin of their hostility towards Greece from the fall of Ilium," that is, Troy.[26] In other words, the myth of the Trojan War provides the historical explanation and mythological backstory not only for the age-old conflict between Greece and Persia

but also for the emergence of Europe and Asia as cultural and ideological opposites and mutual foils in the creation of two collective identities.

From this, a couple of relevant conclusions can be drawn. First, the opposition of Asia and Europe, although seemingly self-evident throughout history, is not a naturally preexisting fact but a cultural construct resulting from specific historical conditions, namely, the development of Greek identity and collective self-awareness in the aftermath of the Persian wars. Second, because Herodotus linked the antithesis of Greeks versus Persians to the Trojan War and both peoples are considered representations of their respective places of origin, Europe and Asia came to be understood not just as geographical but as cultural and ideological opposites. This constellation has very real consequences which can be seen in many a political debate even today: whenever the issue is raised whether Turkey is more of a European or an Asian country, the very categories used to describe the question—Europe and Asia, with all the connotations these terms carry—can ultimately be traced back to the myth of Troy.

Lieux de mémoire or entangled memory?

Before we can analyze in more detail the role of the myth of Troy for contemporary European culture and identity, it is necessary to establish a terminological framework. Since the term Troy refers, among other things, to a geographical location, the notion of *lieu de mémoire* would seem to be a reasonable choice. A short explanation will clarify, however, why I do not use this influential concept, but instead turn to a more recent theory in the field of memory studies: Gregor Feindt et al.'s model of entangled memory.[27]

The concept of *lieu de mémoire* was developed and established by the historian Pierre Nora in an attempt to study French national identity "not in the traditional thematic or chronological manner but instead by analyzing the places in which the collective heritage of France was crystallized, the principal *lieux*, in all senses of the word, in which collective memory was rooted, in order to create a vast topology of French symbolism." To create this topology, Nora aimed "to exhume significant sites, to identify the most obvious and crucial centers of national memory, and then to reveal the existence of invisible bonds tying them all together."[28] From

this statement it is obvious that a *lieu de mémoire* refers first and foremost to an actual geographic location and that the whole notion is intimately connected to the idea of the (French) nation. Although this connection did not impede the success of Nora's term, Astrid Erll has pointed out that the concept of nation profoundly influenced subsequent works in the field of memory studies: "In the wake of Nora's project, which was quickly adopted virtually across the globe, cultural memory was incarnated as, and became synonymous with, 'national remembrance.' The sites-of-memory approach was used as a tool to reconstruct—and at the same time, wittingly or unwittingly: to actively construct—national memory." This focus on national memory has provoked extensive criticism by subsequent generations of memory scholars who argue that "Pierre Nora bequeathed a whole chain of conceptual flaws to the study of memory and nation.… Nora's approach binds memory, ethnicity, territory, and the nation-state together, in the sense of 'a (mnemonic) space for each race.'"[29]

Even in the light of this legitimate criticism, it has to be acknowledged that Nora developed his idea, as he states, "from a relatively narrow to a relatively broad concept of *lieu de mémoire*."[30] The term came to refer not only to historically significant locations but also to formative historical events, rituals and symbols, as well as historical, mythical or legendary figures, and even to influential works of art, ideas or principles, not just of nations but also of transnational entities such as Europe.[31] This broader scope of *lieu de mémoire* is also reflected in the official definition Nora gave in the preface to the English-language edition of his magnum opus: "If the expression *lieu de mémoire* must have an official definition, it should be this: a *lieu de mémoire* is any significant entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community (in this case, the French community)."[32]

This broader definition specifically includes *lieux* of nonmaterial nature, and to emphasize the fact that the material object is but one aspect of his notion, Nora argues that all *lieux* "are *lieux* in three senses of the word—material, symbolic, and functional":

> Even an apparently purely material site, like an archive, becomes a *lieu de mémoire* only if the imagination invests it with a symbolic aura. A purely functional site, like a classroom manual, a testament,

> or a veterans' reunion belongs to the category only inasmuch as it is also the object of a ritual. And the observance of a commemorative minute of silence, an extreme example of a strictly symbolic action, serves as a concentrated appeal to memory by literally breaking a temporal continuity.[33]

Based on this more general definition of the term, the myth of Troy can indeed be understood as a *lieu de mémoire*.[34] Why then not use Nora's well-established term?

There are two reasons for this decision. First, I am convinced, like Astrid Erll, that the concept of *lieu de mémoire* remains deeply influenced by the category of nation and therefore still resonates with Nora's "old-fashioned concept of national culture and its puristic memory."[35] The second reason for my decision results directly from this association and its connotations: due to Nora's original purpose to create a "topology of French symbolism," any *lieu de mémoire* is inescapably tied to one specific social, political or cultural formation. Only in the confines of this context can "[m]useums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, fraternal orders" be considered *lieux de mémoire*, because any archive, festival or treaty is a *lieu de mémoire* only in relation to this specific group.[36] Since the use of Nora's category includes "the danger of treating social groups as essential and static entities,"[37] *lieux de mémoire* are not to be understood as cultural signifiers. Instead of offering multiple simultaneous possibilities of interpretation in different contexts, each *lieu* only provides the answer to one single question: What is the relevance of this specific building, symbol, or piece of art for one particular cultural formation? The answer to this question may change over time, but the question itself, that is, the context in which a particular *lieu de mémoire* is considered relevant, will always remain the same. Therefore, the notion of *lieu de mémoire* itself is, for lack of a better term, a one-dimensional concept. This limitation, together with the implicit reference to the category of nation, makes it too restrictive and inflexible to adequately describe and analyze the manifold interpretations of the myth of Troy.

In stark contrast to Nora's *lieux de mémoire*, the model of "entangled memory" is probably best characterized by its multitude of dimensions and perspectives. Based on the premise that "acts of remembering undergo

processes of objectification and thus gain independence from the particular temporal and spacial context from which they stem," Feindt and his colleagues regard these acts as "a phenomenon of discourse, [and] their objectifications … a semiotic phenomenon" and designate these objectifications as "*mnemonic signifiers*, which can refer to any socially relevant figuration of memory." To illustrate the nature of such a mnemonic signifier, they describe "the entangled memories of *Versailles*." If understood as a mnemonic signifier, the famous castle of Louis XIV could be, in a simultaneously synchronic and diachronic perspective, "a metaphor for French absolutism, American independence, or German defeat in the First World War."[38] By contrast, it would hardly be possible to consider *Versailles* a *lieu de mémoire* for Germany or the United States. The example of Versailles as a mnemonic signifier illustrates, how "[d]ifferent interpretations, distant in time and space respectively, of the same mnemonic signifier ascribe changing meanings to it. By virtue of this, a mnemonic signifier forms the intersection of different *mnemonic signified*."[39]

According to the authors, a mnemonic signifier can be defined as "the juncture of concurrent interpretations with an unlimited variety of possible constellations," or, to speak metaphorically, as a knot in the discursive net of cultural memory. While this is not the place to recount the details of this notion, it is necessary to stress that at least according to Feindt et al., "[t]he analysis of an act of remembering … can be differentiated into a synchronic and a diachronic dimension": as far as the synchronic dimension is concerned, "[d]ifferent and even competing synchronic patterns of interpretation shape the interpretations of the mnemonic signifier," thus situating it within the greater context of cultural discourses such as "political ideologies, religious doctrines, or judicial norm systems." In a diachronic perspective, a specific mnemonic signifier may be connected both to its own previous interpretations and to other mnemonic signifiers earlier in time, so that "[e]very act of remembering stands simultaneously in a relation of either iteration or alteration to several of these diachronic patterns."[40]

Considering this complex structure that describes memory as "plural and dynamic, single acts of remembering are to be understood as *entangled*," a term reflecting "multiple perspectives, asymmetries, and cross-referential mnemonic practices."[41] It is the aim of this article to demonstrate how the myth of Troy can be understood as a mnemonic signifier, using as

examples mnemonic signified that span the last two millennia of European history. Further, it aims to untangle selected threads of this mnemonic discourse to show how they contribute to European cultural identity even in the twenty-first century.

Memory, intentional history and collective identities

Even if the various interpretations of the myth of Troy are indeed key aspects of a collective European memory, the question remains: how does this memory discourse translate into cultural identity? This process can be characterized using Gehrke's concept of "intentional history," a term describing a "projection in time of the elements of subjective, self-conscious self-categorization which construct the identity of a group as a group."[42] This definition overlaps significantly with Feindt et al.'s notion of memory:

> [M]emory refers to acts of mental representation in which signs bring something absent to the fore of consciousness. Acts of remembering differ from other acts of mental representation in that they denote the absent *as past*. It is common ground that far from constituting an objective reality; the past, in its "ontic absence … *in itself*" essentially emerges from present ascriptions with their respective conditions of knowledge-production and usages of the past.[43]

For both Feindt et al. and Gehrke, knowledge about the past is a result of projections or ascriptions, and therefore a construct shaped and influenced by present-day ideology and assumptions.

Due to these similarities, intentional history bridges the gap between the myth of Troy as a mnemonic signifier and the category of European cultural identity. In more general terms, the connection between the historical knowledge of a social formation like a tribe, a people or a nation—which is to say, its memory—and this group's collective identity can be established as follows:

> Social knowledge of the past, in other words that which a society knows and holds for true about its past, its "intentional history," is of fundamental significance for the *imaginaire*, the way a society

> interprets and understands itself, and therefore for its inner coherence and ultimately its collective identity.[44]

This definition, however, does not presuppose the existence of an ontological, "prerepresentional past,"[45] but assumes that collective memory manifests itself as "history in a group's own understanding, especially insofar as it is significant for the make-up and identity of the group."[46] Considering the unique importance of Homer and his works in Mediterranean antiquity, it is not surprising that the *Iliad* served as a major source of historical background for countless Greek and Roman communities, allowing them to constitute their cultural identity.[47]

The most famous example for this process is the founding myth of the city of Rome, allegedly founded in 753 BCE. The ancestry of its founder Romulus can be traced back through the generations to the Trojan hero Aeneas, who, protected and guided by his mother, the goddess Aphrodite, had escaped the burning city and eventually ended up in Italy. For this reason, the Roman people considered themselves descendants of the Trojans, and Julius Caesar even assumed a direct connection not only to Aeneas but also to the goddess of love herself: in the eulogy for his Aunt Julia, Caesar claimed that "the Julii, to which our family belongs, go back to Venus."[48] The sudden appearance of the Goddess of Love in the genealogy of a historical figure would not have posed much of a problem since, according to Gehrke, the ancient Greeks and Romans saw themselves as "located in a temporal continuum at the beginning of which stood events tied to a primeval world of sacred myth and to which one was none the less connected 'from ancestral times,' i.e. from the times of heroes and sons of deities."[49] And while they were certainly aware that the mythological figures they considered their ancestors were significantly different from themselves, Edith Hall notes that "[w]hen it comes to the view of historical figures from well beyond living memory the distinction between history and myth indeed becomes invalid." This mytho-historical continuity is the reason why "such events as the Trojan war or the legendary migrations of relatively large groups and tribes … always counted as historical" in ancient times.[50] Just like the ancient Greeks and Romans, medieval and even modern peoples and nations such as the Franks, the British and the Turks, referred to Troy as their place of origin.[51]

Although each community considers its collective memory to be the truth about its past, it is essential to the notion of intentional history that this supposed "historical truth" is actually a construct, a projection back in time of what the members of those communities believe about themselves and their origins on the basis of collective memory. Since this knowledge is the result of a discursive process, every participant in this discourse can, at least potentially, alter or influence its content, whether this participant be a person or an institution: an artist or a historian, a university or an exhibition, a popular feature on the History Channel or the opinion articles in the *New York Times*.[52] Therefore, intentional history "is always capable of being built up or extended, no surprising fact given its very genesis in a creative and constructive process. One could—and can—'tinker with' this history ... according to one's interests, and yet ultimately create facts and lay down realities."[53] Intentional history can be changed and manipulated according to specific political or ideological interests, and since the collective identity of a group is determined by this history, whoever manages to influence the "intentional past" also influences the way in which members of a certain group perceive themselves and their place in the world. This is true, as Adam Goldwyn demonstrates convincingly, not only in ancient Greek *poleis* or medieval feudal communities, but also in the globalized world of the twenty-first century:

> [T]he current use of classical paradigms is about more than simply explaining the present in terms of a past whose meaning is fixed and inviolable; it is, in fact, a means of persuasion, an attempt to reshape the past in light of the present political and social context. Thus, though the events of the past remain unchanged, that past is interpreted to suit the author's own motivations and ideologies.... The dispute among the commentators, therefore, is also an argument over political authority, over who owns the past and who has the right to legitimize themselves and their positions through that ownership.[54]

The examples in this article show how various meanings came to be ascribed to the myth of Troy throughout the ages, allowing it to be understood as a mnemonic signifier: the Romans—and whoever referred to them as their ancestors—considered the city of Troy their place of origin, and the myth of the Trojan War one source of their collective identity, while for rulers like Alexander and Caesar the connection to Troy was a means

to legitimate their rule. The idea of being a direct descendent of Trojan heroes was therefore of great personal significance to both the Macedon and the Roman, supporting their claim of *nobilitas* and individual greatness. The fact that these mnemonic signifieds are to be found throughout history and all over Europe also serves as an indication for the ubiquitous significance of the myth of Troy.

The myth of Troy in contemporary Europe

The story of the Trojan War is widely known in the Western world, and many people recognize the names of Achilles, Hector, Helen and Odysseus. When hearing the name Homer, however, most contemporaries will think of a yellow cartoon character rather than the creator of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[55] This discrepancy illustrates the fact that the myth of Troy has long since traveled not only "across and beyond territorial and social boundaries," expanding outward from the geographical location of its origin, but also "through media history: from orality to writing to print, film and the Internet."[56] As a result of this development, "more accounts of the Trojan War are being produced today, and in more different genres, than at any time in history," and it might therefore be "more accurate to speak of the 'Trojan Wars' in plural than the 'Trojan War' in singular, as every new artist working in this tradition cannot but simultaneously draw from and revise the essential elements of the narrative to suit his or … her own aesthetics and ideological positions."[57]

This is doubtless the case for one of the most recent and influential versions of the Trojan War story, Wolfgang Petersen's *Troy* (2004), "the first blockbuster Hollywood epic on an ancient Greek subject made in the twenty-first century."[58] The success of this new cinematic version proves the fascination still associated with a tale that has already been told countless times, and further propagates the myth of Troy all over the world.[59] In the language of entangled memory, Petersen's *Troy* and all the other movies and works of art, as well as countless articles published in the course of an extensive scholarly debate, can be understood as different interpretations of the same mnemonic signifier, i.e. the myth of Troy, which in turn "forms the intersection of [all these] different *mnemonic signified*."[60]

As a result of this virtual omnipresence of the Trojan War story, even people who have never read Homer's *Iliad* will still associate a giant wooden horse with the city of Troy. This high recognition value of the Trojan horse was effectively utilized by the popular exhibition *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit* which opened in 2001 in Germany: visitors approaching the exhibition area were greeted by a giant wooden horse.[61] The success of the Troy exhibition itself, which had a total of more than 900,000 visitors in the three showings in Stuttgart, Braunschweig and Bonn, is another indication of the widespread public interest in Troy and the story of the Trojan War.[62] The exhibition also ignited one of the most heated scholarly arguments in recent German history, the so-called "New Battle of Troy." While it started out as a purely academic debate fought in journal articles and conference presentations, the name of Troy quickly attracted the attention of the public: major German newspapers like *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Die Welt* featured extensive articles on the topic, making it a media event comparable to the "Historikerstreit" (historians' quarrel) of 1986/87 on the Holocaust or the controversial reaction to Daniel Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* in 1996.

To understand the following argument, it is necessary to summarize some of the most important aspects of this complex and fascinating debate.[63] The exhibition's main scholarly advisor was the late Manfred Korfmann, then professor of archaeology at Tübingen University and head of the excavation at the site of Hisarlik in modern Turkey, where Heinrich Schliemann had located the ruins of Troy. In Korfmann's opinion as expressed in numerous articles and conference presentations, Troy in the Bronze Age was a residential city with a royal palace and a vast lower urban area within the city walls, home to 5,000 to 10,000 people.[64] He also considers the city of Troy to be the urban center of an influential "Trojan civilization," a center of trade in the third and second millennium BCE, with mercantile connections not only to Northern Anatolia, the Mediterranean, or the area around the Black Sea, but as far as Afghanistan and Egypt.[65] The exhibition *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit* reflected these beliefs, which were most prominently manifested in the wooden model of Troy that sparked the controversy in the first place.[66]

This theory, however, was challenged by Frank Kolb, professor of ancient history and Korfmann's colleague at the University of Tübingen. He denied the validity of Korfmann's conclusions, calling his description

of Troy a mere fiction with no basis in reality and considering the wooden model of Troy to be a fantasy rather than a reconstruction. In Kolb's opinion, the exhibition *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit*, instead of representing historical reality, was used to create and distribute a new myth: the myth of Troy as an Anatolian residential city and trade metropolis. According to Kolb's own theory, the city of Troy in the Bronze Age was nothing more than a proto-urban center controlling the Troas, the plain surrounding the city.[67]

The dispute between Kolb and Korfmann remains unresolved to this day.[68] In the context of this article, however, recounting it serves a twofold purpose: first, the academic discussion and its resonance in the popular media demonstrate once more the fascination of the myth of Troy not just among professional scholars but also among a broader public. Second and more importantly, however, the "New Battle of Troy" serves as yet another illustration of the flexibility and usefulness of the model of entangled memory: The wooden model of the city, the exhibition as a whole and, in a wider, more abstract understanding of the term, even the scholarly articles accompanying it can be understood as mnemonic signified, with the myth of Troy once again functioning as a mnemonic signifier, that is, according to Feindt et al., constituting "the juncture of concurrent interpretations with an unlimited variety of possible constellations." Two possible constellations conjoining these specific mnemonic signifieds are presented by Kolb and Korfmann respectively: the mnemonic signifier "Troy" in this case refers either to the central city of a powerful Trojan civilization or to a proto-urban settlement of very limited relevance or influence. While these two contradictory interpretations constitute a fairly simple constellation, it becomes rather more complex once politics become involved.

Before answering the question how this academic dispute could possibly have any relevance for contemporary politics, a clarification seems to be in order: while it is the basic assumption of this article that the tale of the Trojan War as told in the *Iliad* does indeed constitute one of the roots of European culture and civilization, it is vital to stress that the metaphor "root of European culture" does not refer to the actual ruins found on the hill of Hisarlik in Western Anatolia, but rather to the *myth of Troy*. This necessary distinction, however, has not stopped countless scholars since Heinrich Schliemann from trying to establish a connection between the

tale of Homer's *Iliad* and the archaeological site in modern Turkey, that is, from trying to prove that the Trojan War "really" happened.[69] It is this tradition that gave rise to the notion that with his excavation in Hisarlik, Manfred Korfmann had unearthed the material roots of European culture.

Turkey and/in Europe

Historically, the political dimension of this notion is represented by a movement called *Türk Hümanizmi* or "Turkish Humanism," which emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. Its supporters declared Homer to be an "Anatolian Poet," the hexameter an "Anatolian measure," and the *Iliad* as well as the *Odyssey* "the most important and oldest sources of Anatolian culture," thereby turning, as Barbara Kranz succinctly put it, Classical Antiquity into a "period of Anatolian regional history."[70] In his book *Tatort Troia* (Crime scene Troy), Frank Kolb provides a more recent example of this tendency: while describing the various ways in which the myth of Troy has been used as an ideological tool from antiquity to modern times, Kolb quotes an article published in the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* on September 22, 2003: "The Trojan War was the first attack of the West upon Anatolia, which had by far surpassed the West in matters of civilization and wealth. To regard Hector as an ancestor of Mustafa Kemal Attatürk [*sic*] is one example how history could be interpreted correctly in retrospective."[71]

A similar connection between ancient Troy and modern Turkey is strongly suggested in various contributions to the volume accompanying the exhibition *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit*: one of Korfmann's articles, for example, entitled "Die Troianische Hochkultur (Troia VI und VIIa)," bears the programmatic subtitle "An Anatolian Culture," and one of the section headings proclaims that Troy had been "looking out towards Anatolia."[72]

It is true that the archaeological site at Hisarlik is indeed located in modern-day Anatolia, and if there ever was a single individual poet named Homer, he might have been born and lived in that general area. Calling Troy an "Anatolian city" and Homer an "Anatolian poet," however, does much more than just associate both with a certain geographic area. This recontextualization claims the cultural significance of the myth of Troy for

European culture and identity and locates its origins in modern Turkey. A statement by Ahmet Necdet Sezer, at that time president of the Republic of Turkey, served the same purpose. In his introductory note to the volume accompanying the exhibition, he expressed his hope that *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit* would convey to the German public that the strongest roots of European culture were to be found in Anatolia.[73]

In claiming the myth of Troy as genuinely Anatolian, Sezer firmly plants the cradle of European culture on top of the hill of Hisarlik, thus creating yet another mnemonic signified: due to the codification of town, poet and epos as Anatolian, the mnemonic signifier Troy now not only refers to the origin of European culture and civilization but also indicates the existence of inseparable ties connecting the myth of Troy to the local culture of Anatolia. This interpretation is supported by the authority of the assembled scholarly articles in the volume as well as by the compelling visual evidence of the exhibition itself: as a result of Korfmann's argument and its presentation, Hartwin Brandt argues, "a new, Anatolianizing and Anatolianized myth of Troy is being propagated, following the tradition of Atatürk and his supporters in their demonstrative attempts to politically and culturally reshape Turkey and to orient it towards the West."[74] When framed in the terms of entangled memory, here too the mnemonic signifier "Troy" takes on a rather narrow and distinctively nationally tinged meaning, which opens the possibility for its use in the political debate about the relationship between Turkey and Europe.

Ascribing one specific meaning to the mnemonic signifier "Troy," this interpretation stresses the importance of Turkey for European culture. Taking into account Gehrke's model of intentional history, it is clear that this propagation of a very specific version of historical truth can be understood as an attempt to redefine the collective identity of the Turkish people as European. The motive for this attempt is connected to one of the most controversial questions in European politics, which sparked heated debates at the turn of the new millennium and continues to do so today: Turkey's attempt to become a member of the European Union.

Since 1987 Turkey has been unsuccessful in its attempt to gain membership in the EU, and although the country was recognized as a "membership candidate" in 1999 and the European Council adopted an "Accession Partnership" in 2001, the pace of the accession process has been painfully slow. The Progress Report given by the European Union

in 2002 attributes this to the fact that "Turkey does not fulfill the political and human rights criteria for membership as laid down by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993." It is, however, apparent to anybody following the public discussion of this topic in the media that "the resistance to Turkish accession is also based on … the argument that Turkey is not European: Islam is the predominant religion and most of the population and territory—except a few per cent—are located in Asia."[75]

The claim of cultural difference, while certainly related to religion, is in large part based on the age-old dichotomy of Asia vs. Europe, with Turkey located on one side and countries like Germany, France or Greece on the other.[76] It is precisely this opposition that the Anatolian reinterpretation of the myth of Troy aims to counter and refute. For if European culture and identity were indeed deeply rooted in Anatolia, Turkey's rejection on cultural grounds would be untenable, and its position as an "accessing partner" to the EU greatly strengthened. As two German historians described this process, paraphrasing, at the same time, the concept of intentional history: "The present creates a suitable past for itself. Turkey, striving to be part of Europe and the European Union, also wants to be European in a historical sense—and not just at the fringes, but as a country where the roots of European culture are located."[77]

This analysis has made clear that the strategy Turkey used to interpret its cultural identity as unquestionably European is quite similar to the way various peoples in antiquity referred to the myth of Troy. The fact that precisely Troy was chosen as a mnemonic signifier to support the Turkish claim is another piece of evidence underlining the lasting significance of the myth of Troy for European cultural identity.

Rethinking the myth of troy in a european context

European cultural identity "is a construction, an elaborate palimpsest of stories, images, resonances, collective memories, invented and carefully nurtured traditions," a web of concepts, ideas, and memories of historical events, of real and fictional figures and their legends and myths.[78] And while Brandt has argued that "Europe as an idea, as a cultural construct, and as a bundle of diverse traditions creating one cultural identity did not and does not need the myth of Troy," both Homer (whether he actually

existed as a single individual or not) and the city of Troy are traditionally counted among the cornerstones of European culture.[79] This understanding is demonstrated for example by the inclusion of articles on both topics not only in the collection *Erinnerungsorte der Antike* (2010) but also in *Europäische Erinnerungsorte* (2012). In the latter, Pim den Boer's article on "Homer and Troy" takes its place among articles on other European *lieux de mémoire* such as Dante's *Divina Commedia*, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and the cities of Rome, Istanbul and Alexandria. As evident by the term "Erinnerungsorte" in the title, this conventional approach to analyzing the significance of Troy in the context of European cultural memory is situated firmly within the framework of Pierre Nora's influential theory of *lieux de mémoire*. As if to underscore these methodological assumptions, the very first sentence of the article addresses Homer as "the earliest Greek site of memory," and on the same page the author calls Troy "an inspiring *lieu de mémoire*."[80]

Convincing as this approach may be within the parameters of Nora's theory, the limitations inherent within the notion of *lieu de mémoire* lead to conceptual problems when applied to the myth of Troy, especially on a European or a global scale. The author acknowledges these problems in the closing sentences of his article: "One can ask whose site of memory Troy is. According to recent archeological research, Troy was an Anatolian fortress located in the sphere of influence of the Hittite Empire. That needs some getting used to, since Trojan descent would now mean Asian descent. In any case, centuries worth of identification are called into question."[81]

Within the confines of Nora's theory, the geographical location of Troy in Anatolia creates a paradox and casts doubt on traditional patterns of collective cultural identity: How can the city of Troy, being located in Asia, be considered a European *lieu de mémoire*? In this article, I have offered what I consider to be a broader, more flexible interpretation of the myth of Troy and its significance for European cultural identity, based on the much more versatile concept of entangled memory. When understood as a mnemonic signifier, that is, as "the juncture of concurrent interpretations with an unlimited variety of possible constellations," the myth of Troy can be understood to signify, at the same time, a multitude of different meanings: it might provide a place of origin for a tribe or a people like the Romans; it might define a people's place in the *kosmos* and explain why they live in enmity with another people, as in the case of

the Greeks and Persians; it might lie at the core of a conceptual antithesis like "Europe vs. Asia," thereby shaping the perception of generations; it might, as the point of contention in a scholarly debate, manifest itself as the wooden model in an exhibition, depicting the central city of a powerful Trojan civilization, or take abstract shape as the intellectual notion of a proto-urban settlement of very limited influence; and finally, it might adopt a distinctly national tinge, claiming the "Anatolian origin" of the city, the poet and his epics, with all the political and cultural implications this claim entails.

All these and potentially countless other interpretations exist simultaneously, without contradicting one another as is the case with different ascriptions of the designation *lieu de mémoire*. Viewing the myth of Troy as a mnemonic signifier has allowed me to reveal its multifaceted nature, analyze and present some of the threads that tie it to the intricate web of European culture and identity, and thereby demonstrate that, even in the twenty-first century, Europeans in many ways are Homer's cultural children.

Notes

1. Hartwin Brandt, "Europa und der Mythos von Troia," in Martin Zimmermann, ed., *Der Traum von Troia: Geschichte und Mythos einer ewigen Stadt* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006), 36. Although Brandt's article, like this one, explores the connection between the myth(s) of Troy and European culture and identity, it is substantially different in theoretical foundation, questions of interest and scope of argument. There are a huge number of books and scholarly articles dealing with the idea of Europe. For some central concepts and discussions, see Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

2. In this article, the term "myth" is understood according to the definition in Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 59–60: "Myth is a story one tells to give direction to oneself and the world—a reality of higher order, which not only rings true but also sets normative standards and possesses a formative power." For the German original see Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1992), 76.

3. Barry B. Powell, *Homer. Second Edition* (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 67.

4. Adam J. Goldwyn, "Introduction. 'That Men to Come Shall Know of It': Theorizing Aesthetic Innovation, Heroic Ideology, and Political Legitimacy in Trojan War Reception," in Adam J. Goldwyn, ed., *The Trojan Wars and the Making of the Modern World* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 2015), 2.

5. Plutarch, *Greek Lives: A Selection of Nine Greek Lives*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 318 (= Plutarch, *Lives*, Alexander VIII, 2).

6. Ibid., Alexander XXVI, 1.

7. Moses I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 3. This is not the place to delve into the intricacies of the notorious "Homeric Question," which actually consists of a number of questions such as: "Who was Homer? When and where did Homer live? Was there a Homer? Is there one author of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, or are there different authors for each? Is there a succession of authors or even of redactors for each? Is there for that matter an unitary *Iliad*, a unitary *Odyssey*?" (Gregory Nagy, *Homeric Questions* [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996], 1.) Among the vast literature on this topic, see also Gregory Nagy, *Homeric Responses* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003); and Martin West, "The Homeric Question Today," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 155, no. 4 (2011): 383–93.

8. Plutarch, *Lives*, Alexander XV, 4.

9. See Dieter Hertel, *Troia: Archäologie, Geschichte, Mythos* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), 91.

10. Phiroze Vasunia, *The Gift of the Nile: Hellenizing Egypt from Aeschylus to Alexander* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1.

11. Paul Cartledge, *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 54.

12. Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 57.

13. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 54; Michael Flower, "Herodotus and Persia," in Carolyn Dewald and John Maricola, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 275.

14. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 11. "In fact, the Greek-barbarian antithesis is a strictly polar dichotomy, being not just contradictory but jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Greeks + barbarians = all humankind.… Moreover, they pressed polarization to its (ideo)logical limits. Thus whereas Greeks were ideally seen as not-barbarians, barbarians were equally envisioned as being precisely what Greeks were not" (ibid.).

15. Brandt, "Europa und der Mythos von Troia," 27. (All translations from German are mine unless otherwise indicated.)

16. It seems prudent to point out in this context that "'[t]he Greeks' … is an abstraction, and, at times, an inconvenient one. Herodotus may have thought that he could usefully define *to Hellēnikon*, literally 'the Greek thing' or 'Greekness' in terms of common blood, language, religion, and mores…. But … *to Hellēnikon* was no less of an ideological construct than, say, Christendom was in the Middle Ages or 'the Arab world' is today" (Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 3).

17. Flower, "Herodotus and Persia," 274, 275. A general description and analysis of Persian society as depicted by Herodotus can be found in Rosaria V. Munson, "Who Are Herodotus' Persians?," *Classical World* 102, no. 4 (2009): 457–70.

18. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 53.

19. Munson, "Who Are Herodotus' Persians?," 457.

20. Flower, "Herodotus and Persia," 275.

21. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 53.

22. Flower, "Herodotus and Persia," 276.

23. Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 13.

24. Flower, "Herodotus and Persia," 276.

25. Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4 (= Herodotus, *Histories* I, 4).

26. Ibid.

27. See Gregor Feindt, Félix Krawatzek, Daniela Mehler, Friedemann Pestel and Rieke Trimçev, "Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory Studies," *History and Theory* 53, no. 1 (2014): 24–44.

28. Pierre Nora, "Preface to the English-Language Edition: From *Lieux de mémoire* to *Realms of Memory*," in Lawrence D. Kritzman under the direction of Pierre Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, vol. 1, *Conflicts and Divisions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xv, xvii.

29. Astrid Erll, "Travelling Memory," *Parallax* 17 (2011): 7.

30. Nora, "From *Lieux de mémoire* to *Realms of Memory*," xvii. In the years since it was coined, numerous scholars have applied the concept of *lieu de mémoire* to different national and transnational contexts; see for example Pim den Boer, "*Loci memoriae—Lieux de mémoire*," in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, eds., *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 19–25.

31. See Pim den Boer, Heinz Duchhardt, Georg Kreis and Wolfgang Schmale, eds., *Europäische Erinnerungsorte*, 3 vols. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012). Volume 2 alone includes articles on the anthem of the European Union, the Roman Trea-

ties of 1957, Goethe's *Faust*, Anne Frank, Immanuel Kant's essay *Zum ewigen Frieden*, the euro, the subway and, not surprisingly, "Homer and Troy."

32. Nora, "From *Lieux de mémoire* to *Realms of Memory*," xvii.

33. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*," *Representations*, no. 26 (1989): 18–19.

34. See Justus Cobet, "Troia—die Suche nach der 'Stadt des Priamos,'" in Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp and Elke Stein-Hölkeskamp, eds., *Erinnerungsorte der Antike*, vol. 1, *Die Griechische Welt* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010), 39–60; and Pim den Boer, "Homer und Troja," in den Boer et al., eds., *Europäische Erinnerungsorte*, vol. 2, *Das Haus Europa* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 189–200.

35. Erll, "Travelling Memory," 7.

36. Nora, "Between Memory and History," 12.

37. Feindt et al., "Entangled Memory," 26. For a more detailed criticism see 25–26.

38. Ibid., 31.

39. Ibid. Although Versailles might be considered a European *lieu de mémoire*, compared to the multiperspectivism of Feindt et al.'s model, Nora's model is still exceedingly limited.

40. Ibid., 32, 35.

41. Ibid., 35.

42. Lin Foxhall and Nino Luraghi, "Introduction," in Lin Foxhall, Hans-Joachim Gehrke and Nino Luraghi, eds., *Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 9.

43. Feindt et al., "Entangled Memory," 28. For the embedded quote see John H. Zamitto, "Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Times(s) and the Practice of History," *History and Theory* 43, no. 1 (2004): 134.

44. Hans-Joachim Gehrke, "Myth, History, and Collective Identity: Uses of the Past in Ancient Greek and Beyond," in Nino Luraghi, ed., *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 286.

45. Jeffrey K. Olick, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 89.

46. Gehrke, "Myth, History and Collective Identity," 298.

47. See Martin Zimmermann, "Troia—eine unendliche Geschichte," in Zimmermann, ed., *Der Traum von Troia*, 12.

48. See Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars*, trans. Catharine Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 4–5 (= Suetonius, *Divus Iulius* 6).

49. Gehrke, "Myth, History, and Collective Identity," 300.

50. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 64–65, 299.

51. For these and various other examples of peoples claiming to be descendants of the Trojans, see Hans-Joachim Gehrke, "Was ist und zu welchem Ende studiert

man intentionale Geschichte? Marathon und Troia als fundierende Mythen," in Gert Melville, Karl-Siegbert Rehberg and Winfried Müller, eds., *Gründungsmythen, Genealogien, Memorialzeichen: Beiträge zur institutionellen Konstruktion von Kontinuität* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003), 30–35. The fact that the claim of a Trojan origin has even influenced the development of modern nation-states such as England and France is demonstrated by Gert Melville, "Troja: Die integrative Wiege europäischer Mächte im ausgehenden Mittelalter," in Ferdinand Seibt and Winfried Eberhard, eds., *Europa 1500: Integrationsprozesse im Widerstreit* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986), 415–32.

52. See Adam J. Goldwyn, "Achaeans, Athenians, and Americans in the Post-9/11 Era: Comparing Empires in *The New York Times*," in Goldwyn, ed., *The Trojan Wars and the Making of the Modern World*, 245–58. In this enlightening article, Goldwyn first postulates "a tradition of paradigmatic use of Greek myth and history which has found and held an important place in American political discourse ever since the nation's inception" (246). He then proceeds to show how the Trojan War has functioned as a paradigm both to support and to oppose the United States' engagement in Iraq under the Bush administration, using examples from the op-ed page of the *New York Times*.

53. Gehrke, "Myth, History, and Collective Identity," 309.

54. Goldwyn, "Achaeans, Athenians, and Americans in the Post-9/11 Era," 247.

55. It is obvious that this homonymy did not escape the writers of *The Simpsons*, since the third episode, first aired on January 21, 1990, is titled *Homer's Odyssey*.

56. Erll, "Travelling Memory," 12. While it would doubtlessly be equally fascinating and fruitful to use the terms and concepts of Erll's "traveling memory" to describe the myth of Troy, this would exceed the scope of this article in both content and length.

57. Goldwyn, "Introduction," 1.

58. Martin M. Winkler, ed., *Return to Troy: New Essays on the Hollywood Epic* (Malden: Brill, 2015), 1. With a budget of $175 million, the movie grossed $497 million worldwide. See www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?page=main&id=troy.htm (accessed November 20, 2016). For a chronology of big-screen adaptations of the Trojan War myth and comments on individual films, see Martin M. Winkler, "The Trojan War on the Screen: An Annotated Filmography," in Martin M. Winkler, ed., *Troy: From Homer's Iliad to Hollywood Epic* (Malden: Brill, 2007), 202. A more extensive analysis of notable movie adaptations between 1956 and 2004 is provided by Mischa Meier, "Troia im Film," in Zimmermann, ed., *Der Traum von Troia*, 179–93.

59. See Robert Burgoyne, "Introduction," in Robert Burgoyne, ed., *The Epic Film in World Culture* (New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 7. As

if to prove my point, Wolfgang Petersen's *Troy* was shown on television the very day I first wrote this passage—in a gym in Seoul, South Korea.

60. Feindt et al., "Entangled Memory," 31. See also Martin M. Winkler, ed., *Troy: From Homer's Iliad to Hollywood Epic* (Malden: Brill, 2007). The articles in both volumes edited by Winkler address various aspects of the cinematic adaptations of the myth of Troy, focusing on Petersen's movie.

61. For the exhibition's official homepage (in German), see www.troia.de (accessed November 20, 2016). This "Trojan Horse" was approximately 15.5 meters high, 9 meters wide and 13 meters long, with a weight of about 45 tons. It consisted of a steel construction covered with wooden planks and had spiral staircases in both front legs so that visitors could enter the body. In the context of Feindt et al.'s theory of entangled memory, the wooden horse can be considered another mnemonic signified referring back to the mnemonic signifier that is the myth of Troy.

62. See Gregor Weber, "Neue Kämpfe um Troia—der Streit der Medien," in Zimmermann, ed., *Der Traum von Troia*, 169.

63. For an extensive account of the "New Battle of Troy," a more detailed analysis of the two competing interpretations and especially the philosophical and epistemological implications of this debate for the writing of history in general, see Christian Baier, "Fiktionale Städte: Der 'neue Kampf um Troia' und die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit," in Christian Baier, Nina Benkert and Hans-Joachim Schott, eds., *Die Textualität der Kultur: Gegenstände, Methoden, Probleme der kultur- und literaturwissenschaftlichen Forschung* (Bamberg: Bamberg University Press, 2014), 57–99.

64. See Manfred Korfmann, "Die Troianische Hochkultur (Troia VI und VIIa): Eine Kultur Anatoliens," in Archäologisches Landesmuseum Baden-Würtemberg, ed., *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit*, 395. The so called "Homeric Troy" is generally identified with the layers "Troy VI" and "Troy VIIa," which correspond to the late Bronze Age, a period between 1700 and 1300/1250 BCE for Troy VI and between 1300/1250 and 1200 BCE for Troy VIIa. See Michael Siebler, *Troia: Mythos und Wirklichkeit* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 2001), 152.

65. See Manfred Korfmann, "Troia als Drehscheibe des Handels im 2. und 3. vorchristlichen Jahrtausend: Erkenntnisse zur troianischen Hochkultur und zur Maritimen [*sic*!] Troia-Kultur," in Archäologisches Landesmuseum Baden-Würtemberg, ed., *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit*, 355, 360.

66. For a picture of this model see Baier, "Fiktionale Städte," 70.

67. See Frank Kolb, "Ein neuer Troia-Mythos? Traum und Wirklichkeit auf dem Grabungshügel von Hisarlik," in Hans-Joachim Behr, Gerd Biegel and Helmut Castritius, eds., *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit: Ein Mythos in Geschichte und Rezeption. Tagungsband zum Symposion im Braunschweiger Landesmuseum am*

8. und 9. Juni 2001 im Rahmen der Ausstellung Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit (Braunschweig: Braunschweiger Landesmuseum, 2002), 30, 8, 9, 31.

68. For more detailed summaries of both Kolb's and Korfmann's positions see Hertel *Troia*, 44–70, and Zimmermann, "Troia," 19–24. The assumptions and conclusions of Manfred Korfmann and his supporters are presented at length in the work of Joachim Latacz, *Troia und Homer: Der Weg zur Lösung eines alten Rätsels* (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 2010). Frank Kolb has described his own position in a monograph, *Tatort "Troia": Geschichte, Mythen, Politik* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2010).

69. These attempts are viewed very critically by many scholars who consider it necessary to distinguish between the philological analysis of Homer's epic and the results unearthed by archaeological excavations. See Zimmermann, "Troia," 18–19.

70. Brandt, "Europa und der Mythos von Troia," 32; Barbara Kranz, *Das Antikenbild der modernen Türkei* (Würzburg: Ergon, 1998), 128, cited in ibid., 284. Krantz analyzes the phenomenon of "Turkish Humanism" much more extensively.

71. Kolb, *Tatort Troia*, 19–20. Mustafa Kemal, called "Atatürk" (1881–1938), was the founder of modern Turkey and the first president of the Republic of Turkey.

72. Korfmann, "Troia als Drehscheibe des Handels," 395, 397.

73. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, "Grußwort," in Archäologisches Landesmuseum Baden-Würtemberg, ed., *Troia—Traum und Wirklichkeit*, viii.

74. Brandt, "Europa und der Mythos von Troia," 31. Brandt himself refers to the article of Martin Zimmermann, "Der Troianische Krieg in der Legitimation vom archaischen Griechenland bis zur Türkei der Gegenwart," in Nikolaus Buschmann, Dieter Langewiesche, eds., *Der Krieg in den Gründungsmythen europäischer Nationen und der USA* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004), 398–418.

75. Harry Flam, "Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession," *CESifo Working Paper* no. 893 (2003): 1, available at http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76270 (accessed November 20, 2016). For information on the relation between Turkey and the EU see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm (accessed November 20, 2016). In their analysis of "citizens' attitudes towards Turkish accession in the 27 EU Member States," Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans demonstrate that "a clear majority of citizens reject the idea of Turkey joining the EU," naming four factors that "work rather well to explain this rejection: the economic benefit of Turkish accession, cultural differences, political ideology and general attitudes towards the EU." Jürgen Gerhards and Silke Hans, "Why Not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in European Countries," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no 4 (2011): 741.

76. Among the extensive scholarship on Islam and Europe, see Talal Asad, "Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?" in Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe*, 209–27; Aziz al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, eds., *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Jocelyn Cesari, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of European Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). The contrast between Turkey and the EU was put in the spotlight in 2016 by the Syrian refugee crisis and the agreement between the EU and Turkey to deal with it; by the tensions in the wake of the Turkish military's failed attempt to overthrow the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on July 15 and 16 of the same year; and (in a case specifically concerning German-Turkish relations) by the so called "Böhmermann affair," when German comedian and television host Jan Böhmermann drew international attention when he published first a satirical song and later a crude and sexually explicit poem mocking Erdoğan. The Turkish government's subsequent demand for Böhmerman's criminal prosecution was approved by the German government, an action that drew harsh criticism from multiple sources as a restriction of freedom of speech and the rights of satire. These issues, however, fascinating as they may be, are far too complex to be addressed here in any depth.

77. Justus Cobet and Hans-Joachim Gehrke, "Warum um Troia immer wieder streiten?," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 53, no. 6 (2002): 316. At this point, I would like to stress (just as Cobet and Gehrke have done) that this is not intended to be any kind of political statement. In this article, Turkey's case merely serves as an example to demonstrate how the myth of Troy has been used as part of a political discourse even in the twenty-first century.

78. Antony Pagden, "Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent," in Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe*, 33.

79. Brandt, "Europa und der Mythos von Troia," 36.

80. Den Boer, "Troja," 189.

81. Ibid., 199.

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